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ADMIRALTY - LACHES - APPLICABILITY TO CLAIM BASED ON
UNSEAWORTHINESS BROUGHT ON CIVIL SIDE OF
FEDERAL COURT
A longshoreman was injured while unloading a ship, and
sued the shipowner on the civil side1 of federal district court,
alleging that his injury was caused by the unseaworthiness of
the vessel. His suit was brought over five years after the injury
and the district court dismissed it on the ground that it was
barred by the two-year state limitation on tort actions, or, in the
alternative, by the admiralty doctrine of laches. The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held, affirmed, but only on the
second ground. The proper method of determining whether a
claim for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness is time-
barred is to apply the admiralty doctrine of laches, not the state
statute of limitations, even though the action is brought on the
civil side of federal court and jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship. Oroz v. American President Lines, 259 F.2d 636
(2d Cir. 1958).
Maritime law requires the shipowner to furnish a seaworthy
vessel and holds him absolutely liable to seamen2 and certain
harbor workers 3 who are injured because of a defect in the ship
or its equipment.4 This right to recover for personal injury
1. The federal courts are vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction over
"admiralty and maritime" cases, "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies
to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1952). Pursuant to
this power, a federal district court sits as a court of admiralty, which is referred
to as the "admiralty side" of federal court. The "civil" or "law" side of federal
court is simply the federal court sitting not as an admiralty court.-See, generally,
GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 30 (1957).
This "saving clause" has 'been interpreted to allow suitors to enforce maritime
causes of action through in personam remedies in state court or on the civil side
of federal court, given diversity of citizenship. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRAITY 33
(1957).
2. The absolute character of the shipowner's liability appears to have been
firmly established by the Supreme Court in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328
U.S. 85 (1946). See 2 NoRRis, LAW OF SEAMEN 242 et seq. (1952) ; GILMoRE &
BLACK, ADMIRALTY 315 et seq. (1957).
3. The right to recover for unseaworthiness has thus far been extended by the
Supreme Court to a longshoreman, Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85
(1946), and a carpenter repairing the ship, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346
U.S. 406 (1953). For an analysis of the trend in this regard see GnrioR &
BLACK, ADMIRALTY 361-64 (1957).
4. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 315 et seq. (1957). For a more detailed
history of the judicial development of the right to recover for injury caused by
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caused by unseaworthiness was not a creation of statute, but
has been fashioned by the federal courts sitting as courts of
admiralty. 5 In the absence of a federal statute fixing the period
of limitation on claims for personal injury caused by unsea-
worthiness, the admiralty courts have utilized the equity doctrine
of laches. 6 Generally a claim based on unseaworthiness will be
held barred by laches if it is brought after an inexcusable delay
which prejudices the defendant.7 In order to determine whether
these conditions are satisfied, admiralty courts are guided by
state statutes of limitation ;" if the state limitation period has
run, the defendant is presumed to have been prejudiced by the
delay and plaintiff must allege and prove facts showing no in-
excusable delay and no prejudice.9 However, the admiralty court
may not simply apply the state statute mechanically, since the
question of laches must be decided after a balancing of the
equities of the case. 10
A claim for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness may
be brought not only on the admiralty side of federal court," but
also in state court 12 or on the civil side of federal court (as-
unseaworthiness, see Tetreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness, and the Right of Harbor
Workers, 39 CORN. L.Q. 381, 386 (1954).
"Equipment" includes the ship's crew. GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 320
(1957). For a collection of the cases see 2 NORRIS, LAW OF SEAMEN 245-52
(1952), and 2 id. 88-100 (Supp. 1958).
5. The right was first announced in The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
6. E.g.; Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956). As au-
thority for the proposition the courts usually cite The Key City, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 653 (1871), which, however, did not involve a claim for personal injury
caused by unseaworthiness.
7. Czaplicki v. The Iloegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, .535 (1956); Kane v.
Union of -Soviet Socialist Republics, 189 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1951); Pinion v.
Mississippi Shipping Co., 156 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1957). See also Gardner
v. Panama R.R., 342 U.S. 29, 31 (1951.) (suit for pbrsonal injuries, but not clear
whether based on unseaworthiness); McDaniel v. Gulf and South American S.S.
Co., 228 F.2d. 189 (5th Cir. 1955) (not clear whether claim based on unsea-
worthiness) ; Morales v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 208 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1953)
(claim based on negligence).
8. Czaplicki v. The Iloegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533 (1956).
9. Wilson v. Northwest Marine Iron Works, 212 F.2d 510 (9th Cir. 1954)
Taylor v. Crain, 195 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 189 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1951.) ; Redman v. United States, I76 F.2d 713
(2d Cir. 1949) ; GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 632 (1957).
1 10. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 533 (1956) (case re-
manded to allow introduction of evidence on prejudice and inexcusable delay, even
though state limitation period had already run) ; Kane v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 189 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1951). Accord, Gardner v. Panama R.R., 342
U.S. 29, 31 (1951) (trial court's finding of laches reversed, even though state
limitation period had run) ; McDaniel v. Gulf and South American S.S. Co., 228
F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1955); Morales v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 208 F.2d 218
(5th.Cir. 1953).
11. London Guar. & Acc. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 279 U.S. 109 (1929).
12. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (dictum) ; Carlisle
Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255 (1922) (semble).
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suming diversity jurisdiction is present),13 where the case may
be tried before a jury. 4 If the action is brought on the civil
side of federal court, a problem arises whether the court is to
apply the admiralty doctrine of laches or the state statute of
limitations directly. It has been the practice for federal courts
in several non-maritime situations to apply state limitation pe-
riods to federally-created rights for which Congress has pro-
vided no statute of limitations.15 Relying on this practice, the
first case to consider the present question held the state period
of limitation directly applicable to a claim for personal injury
caused by unseaworthiness brought on the civil side of federal
court.' Later cases refused to apply the state limitation statutes
directly, holding that laches applied because of the rule that
substantive maritime law governs maritime causes of action
brought in state court or on the civil side of federal court.' 7 This
13. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
14. 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 281 (2d ed. 1951). Whether trial in state
court will be before a jury will, of course, depend upon state law.
15. See 2 id. at 717, for cases applying this rule to the anti-trust laws, the
Fair Labor Standards Act, and the National Bank Act. The application of the
rule was considered by the court in the instant case, but rejected. Oroz v. American
President Lines, 259 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1958).
16. Bonam v. Southern Menhaden Corp., 284 Fed. 362 (S.D. Fla. 1922).
The court conceded that under the then recent holding of Chelentis v. Luckenbach,
247 U.S. 372 (1918), the civil side of federal court was bound to apply substantive
admiralty law to a claim for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness. However,
the court labelled the state statute of limitation as "procedural" and thus ex-
cluded it from the principle of the Chelentis case. The defendant in the instant
case also advanced the argument that the state limitation period was "procedural"
and thus outside the rule that the substantive law of unseaworthiness must be
applied ouside the admiralty court. The argument was rejected. Oroz v. American
President Lines, 259 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1958).
17. White v. American Barge Lines, 127 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa. 1955) ; Hen-
derson v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 119, 120 (E.D. Pa. 1954) ("determination of
the timeliness of the action depends on the equitable doctrine of laches and not
the two-year Pennsylvania statute of limitations"); Apica v. Pennsylvania Ware-
housing & Safe Dep. Co., 101 F. Supp. 575, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1951) ("Consequently,
the doctrine of laches applies rather than the doctrine of limitations, notwithstand-
ing that jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship"; see also the same case
reported earlier at 74 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Pa. 1947), where the same conclusion
was reached with additional authorities cited). In accord with the holding of these
three cases in Szalkiewicz v. Farrell Lines Inc., 142 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.
1956), which apparently was a suit in admiralty court, although this is not clear
from the opinion.
Two recent cases are at least analogously contra the three cases collected above.
In Land v. United States Lines Co., 137 F. Supp. 376 (E.D. N.Y. 1955), plaintiff
sued for wages, maintenance, and cure, apparently on the civil side of federal court.
The court apparently applied the six-year contract limitation period of New York
directly to his claim. However, in support of this procedure the court cited Mar-
shall v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 39 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1930), where
the six-year statute of limitations had been used only as a guide in determining
the question of laches. It is possible, therefore, that in the Land case the court
was using the state statute in such a fashion, although the opinion is not-clear
on this point.
In the second case, Haychuck v. South Atlantic S.S. Line, 127 F. Supp. 49
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rule had been developed by the United States Supreme Court,18
principally in cases holding that the maritime and not the state
rules on burden of proof and contributory negligence applied to
admiralty causes of action brought outside the admiralty courts.19
Basing its conclusion on the rule that admiralty substantive
law is supreme even outside the admiralty court, the court in the
instant case held that the civil side of federal court must apply
laches to a claim for personal injury caused by unseaworthi-
ness.20 The court felt that since rules of contributory negligence21
and burden of proof2 2 had been held to affect so vitally the out-
come of litigation as to be "substantive" for purposes of applica-
tion outside the admiralty court, then the doctrine of laches was
also "substantive" for that purpose. It was argued that since
the civil side of federal court had jurisdiction over the claim
(E.D. Pa. 1954), the Pennsylvania limitation statute was held applicable to a
seaman's claim for wages under 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1952), although application of
the doctrine of laches was urged. This case, decided by Judge Welsh, should be
compared to his opinion in Henderson v. Cargill, Inc., supra, in which he held that
the doctrine of Inches did apply to a claim for personal injury caused by unsea-
worthiness brought on the civil side of federal court.
18. The development is traced in GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 374 (1957).
19. In Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) a seaman
brought suit in state court for negligence under the Jones Act, 41 STAT. 1007
(1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952), and for maintenance and cure under the general
maritime law. Plaintiff had signed a release of his claims prior to trial, but Penn-
sylvania and maritime law differed as to the burden of proof necessary to prove
the validity of such a release. Held, the maritime rule and not the state rule must
be applied by the state court.
In Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), a claim for personal
injury caused by unseaworthiness was brought on the civil side of federal court,
and the issue arose as to whether the state rule of contributory negligence applied.
The Supreme Court held that it did not, and that the admiralty rule of divided
damages applied instead. The argument was advanced that the jurisdiction of the
court depended on diversity of citizenship between the parties under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (1952), and that the state rule of contributory negligence must therefore
be applied under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The
Supreme Court declined to decide whether the civil side of federal court had juris-
diction only if diversity of citizenship existed, but assumed that to be the case,
and still held the doctrine of Erie inapplicable. Erie, stated the court, had merely
"decided that federal district diversity courts must try state-created causes of
action in accordance with state laws." Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S.
406, 410 (1953). This was meant to insure that there be no difference in result
between federal courts and state courts deciding like causes of action. This prin-
ciple of equal justice demanded the application of the same rules on both sides of
federal court for federally-created causes of action, since "the substantial rights
of an injured person are not to be determined differently whether his case is
labelled 'law side' or 'admiralty side' on a district court's docket." Id. at 411.
20. Oroz v. American President Lines, 259 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1958). It
will be observed that this is the first time a federal court of appeals has considered
the question, which has been treated several times earlier by federal district courts.
See notes 16 and 17 supra.
21. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), discussed in note 19
supra.
22. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942) (burden of proof
of the validity of a seaman's release).
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only because of diversity of citizenship, 23 the state statute of
limitations should be applied under the rule of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins.24 The court conceded that under the rule of Erie a
federal court adjudicating rights arising out of state law is bound
to apply the substantive law of the state where the court is
sitting, in order that there be no difference in result between
state and federal courts. 25 However, the court felt that this rule
was not applicable to the present case since the right to recover
for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness was created by
federal maritime law, not by state law. Applying the doctrine of
laches on the civil side of federal court would insure that there
be no difference in result between the two sides of federal
court.
2 6
23. Whether the civil side of federal court has jurisdiction over a claim for
personal injury based on unseaworthiness only if there is diversity of citizenship
between the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952) was actually unsettled at the
time the present case was decided. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had
held in Doucette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834 (1st Cir. 1952) that a claim for per-
sonal injury caused by unseaworthiness was a case which "arises under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States," within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1952), a statute vesting the civil side of federal court with jurisdiction
over such matters. Diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1952), then,
was not necessary for the civil side of federal court to have jurisdiction over the
claim. The contrary position was taken by both the Second and Third Circuits.
Paduano v. Yamashita Kisen Kabushik Kaisha, 221 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1955);
Jordine v. Walling, 185 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1950). Accord, 5 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACTICE 280 (2d ed. 1951). The United States Supreme Court has apparently
settled the matter in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 79 S.Ct.
468 (U.S. 1959), where Justice Frankfurter, in a long review of the authorities,
rejected the notion that a claim for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness
"arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952). See, however, the dissent by Justice Brennan,
in which the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas join. Id. at 489.
24. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The rule of that case, as succinctly stated by Justice
Black in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 410 (1953) was "that
federal district diversity courts must try state created causes of action in ac-
cordance with state laws."
25. The case which perhaps best enunciated the policy behind Erie was Guar-
anty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), in which Justice Frankfurter stated:
"In essence, the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship
of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be sub-
stantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as
it would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-
resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away should
not lead to a substantially different result." Id. at 109.
The holding of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York was that the federal court sitting
in equity was bound to apply a state limitation period to a state-created right being
enforced there. The case, therefore, was at least authority for the application of
state limitation periods in diversity cases, and was urged upon the court in the
instant case. The court distinguished the case on the ground that there a state-
created right was being enforced, whereas in the present case a federally created
right was involved.
26. This was precisely the rationale which the United States Supreme Court
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The rule of the present case, in securing the application of
laches on both sides of federal court to claims based on unsea-
worthiness, tends to promote the uniformity of maritime sub-
stantive law, and so fulfills the policy behind the Supreme Court
cases which developed the theory of maritime law supremacy.
27
Complete uniformity in this regard, however, would not exist
unless state courts entertaining claims for personal injury caused
by. unseaworthiness were also bound to apply the doctrine of
laches. There are apparently no cases holding state courts so
bound.2 8 However, the Supreme Court has required state courts
to apply substantive maritime law instead of state law in deter-
mining the burden of proof of the validity of a seaman's re-
lease,29 and the proper limitation applicable to a claim based
on unseaworthiness when joined with a claim under the Jones
Act.80 It is conceivable, therefore, that in the future a state court
may be compelled to apply the admiralty doctrine of laches to a
claim for personal injury caused by unseaworthiness.
C. Jerre Lloyd
ALIMONY - EFFECT OF FAULT UNDER R.S. 9:301
The wife separated from her husband, who was frequently
visiting the home of an unmarried woman, and she brought suit
for divorce on the grounds of adultery. Because she failed to
prove the alleged adultery, the divorce was not decreed, but she
had used in Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953). See note 19 supra,
for a brief exposition of that case.
27. The notion that maritime law should be uniform throughout the country
was announced by the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S.
205 (1917). The doctrine of the supremacy of maritime law outside the admiralty
courts can be traced to this case. See GILMORE & BLACK, ADMIRALTY 374 (1957).
However, state law has been allowed to supplement maritime law in the areas of
liens, wrongful death statutes, partition and sale of vessels, arbitration, and insur-
ance. See Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 79 S.Ct. 468, 480
(U.S. 1959).
28. The United States Supreme Court declined to decide the question in both
Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926) (state may not apply its limitation period
to the Jones Act, which contains a three-year limitation period of its own), and
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958) (when claim based
on unseaworthiness is joined with count for negligence under the Jones Act, state
may not apply a limitation of less than three years to either count).
29. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1952) (suit in state court
for negligence under the Jones Act and maintenance and cure).
30. McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958). The Jones
Act provides that: "Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of
his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury." 41 STAT. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
